Research into the Formation of Institutions and Their Impact on Welfare (Nobel Prize in Economics 2024)

Authors

  • Oksana Shymanska West Ukrainian National University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2025.03.250

Keywords:

political institutions, economic institutions, extractive and inclusive institutions, colonial origins of institutions, “reversal of fortune”, “exploitative institutions”, welfare

Abstract

Introduction. The question of the impact of institutions on socio-economic development is one of the key issues in modern economic science. The evolution of views on their role - from Adam Smith’s philosophical considerations to formalized models of the “new institutional economy” - demonstrates the depth and complexity of this problem. With this in mind, the contribution of the 2024 Nobel Laureates in Economics Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson is particularly important: based on historical analysis and empirical data, they have proven that the quality of political and economic institutions is a determining factor in the long-term well-being of countries. Their theory of inclusive and extractive institutions offered a new lens for explaining global inequality and laid the foundation for modern approaches to developing effective public policy.

The purpose of the study - is to substantiate the scientific achievements of D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. Robinson - the winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2024.

Methods. In writing the article used general scientific research methods: induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis, mathematical methods, which contributed most to understanding the scientific views of the Nobel Prize winners in economics in 2024 on the preconditions for the formation of institutions, their evolution and impact on the welfare and prosperity of countries.

Results. The contribution of D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. Robinson to the development of institutional economic theory in terms of building an effective model of interaction between political and economic institutions aimed at achieving public welfare is substantiated.

Prospects for further research. By applying an institutional approach to finding the answer to the question of why income differences between countries are significant and persistent, D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson have established a new research tradition designed to help clarify the historical drivers of the prosperity of nations or the inability to achieve it. From a practical point of view, the scholars’ findings provide a solid basis for developing effective political and economic reforms in countries seeking to build efficient institutions. Their ideas are useful in analyzing the problems of income inequality, corruption, and authoritarianism in the countries dimension. The scholarly work of scientists gave impetus to the development of a concept aimed at resolving conflicts between the central government and regional interests, based on the establishment of a balance between a strong state and an active society. Despite the fact that the scientific contribution of D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson does not provide an exhaustive answer to the question of why some countries remain in the “poverty trap,” the scholars have not only formed an understanding of the root causes of the countries’ failures, but also pioneered a new methodology for studying them.

Author Biography

  • Oksana Shymanska, West Ukrainian National University

    PhD (Economics), Associate Professor,

    Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Economic Theory

References

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Published

2025-11-08

How to Cite

Shymanska, Oksana. “Research into the Formation of Institutions and Their Impact on Welfare (Nobel Prize in Economics 2024)”. Herald of Economics, no. 3, Nov. 2025, pp. 250-65, https://doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2025.03.250.

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