Agency problem in management as a challenge for the corporation accounting system
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2019.04.103Keywords:
neo-institutional theory, agency problem, managerial opportunism, accounting in corporate governance.Abstract
Introduction. Corporate governance, as a basis for ensuring the efficient use of corporate resources, can be built on a range of models that have both advantages and disadvantages. Neo-institutional theory, in particular its separate component is agency theory. It is one of the theories that allows to substantiate the reasons for the decline in the quality of implemented corporate governance systems and to formulate ways to improve it, in particular, taking into account the role of accounting in ensuring the effectiveness of their functioning.
Purpose. The aim of the article is to monitor essence and peculiarities of manifestation of agency problem in corporate governance and substantiation of place of accounting in its solution.
Methods. The range of research methods related to the solution of the agent problem in the corporate governance system is applied. Dialectical method of cognition and the systematic approach to the interpretation of corporate governance, the monographic method for monitoring the positions of scientists in the sphere of solving the agent problem, the abstract and logical method for theoretical generalizations and formulation conclusions are used in the research.
Results. The necessity of accounting development in solving the agency problem in corporate management is substantiated. The peculiarities of the development of neo-institutional theory as a theoretical basis of corporate governance are revealed. The necessity to study agency theory as a means of solving problems in corporate governance is substantiated. The essence of agency problem in corporate structures is revealed and the causes of its occurrence are identified. The theoretical principles of agency problem in corporate structures are highlighted. Cases of manifestation of agency problem in corporate structures are analyzed. The basic directions of improvement of the accounting system of the corporate structure with the purpose of minimizing consequences of occurrence of agency problem are highlighted.
Discussion. It is advisable to focus on optimizing specific elements of the corporate accounting system in further research in order to avoid agency issues in the corporate governance system.
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